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THE YOUNG REPORT: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 





This article addresses the Young Report, which is an important recent 
response to Britain’s putative ‘compensation culture’. This Report is 
examined with reference to the far-reaching reforms of tort law that 
occurred in Australia at the start of the twenty-first century. The analysis 
reveals that while there are certain similarities in the way in which tort law 
has been reformed in Australia and Britain, the reforms have ultimately 
unfolded quite differently in these jurisdictions. The main difference is that 
attention in Britain has centred on the system of procedure by which tort law 
is administered whereas in Australia the focus has been on the substantive 
law, including the law governing the assessment of damages. A possible 
reason for this divergence has to do with differences in political ideology.  
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In Britain, as in several other countries, the law of torts is predominantly judge-made.1 For 
example, most of tort law’s central principles, such as those concerning the duty of care, the 
standard of the reasonable person, and the concepts of damage and remoteness, are found in 
the law reports rather than in the statute books. This sets tort law aside from many other 
fields. Of course, this is not to say that tort law has not been touched by legislation. In the 
‘age of statutes’2 in which we live, legislative alteration of tort law is ubiquitous. For instance, 
important statutory provisions apply in relation to occupiers’ liability,3 liability for animals,4 
contributory negligence,5 and fatal accidents.6 Legislation has also made significant changes 
to the procedure by which tort law is administered. However, these statutory modifications do 
not, for the most part, relate to foundational doctrines of the law of torts. In other words, they 
have impacted upon hamlets and villages rather than metropolises or the polity as a whole.  
In some other jurisdictions, the experience has been quite different, and legislation has 
affected a major shift away from basic common law principles. Such a shift occurred in 
Australia at the start of the twenty-first century. Between 2002 and 2004, the governments of 
all Australian States and Territories7 enacted statutes that radically altered the tort system.8 
                                                 
1  Stephen Sugarman writes that ‘tort remains, of all the law school courses we offer, the queen of the common 
law subjects’ (S Sugarman, ‘Assumption of Risk’ (1997) 31 Val UL Rev 833 at 833 n 1).  
2  G Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of the Statutes (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
3  Occupiers Liability Act 1957 (UK); Occupiers Liability Act 1984 (UK).  
4  Animals Act 1971 (UK).  
5  Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK).  
6  Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (UK).  
7  In Australia, the States and Territories have primary responsibility in constitutional terms for the law of tort. 
The Federal Government can only legislate with respect to tort law in so far as doing so falls within a specific 
list of powers granted to it under the Australian Constitution.  
8  The principal pieces of legislation are as follows: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld); Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) (as amended by the 
Wrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002 (SA) and the Law Reform 
(Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA)); Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA); 
Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) (as amended by 
the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic), the Wrongs and Other Acts 
(Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform) 
Act 2003 (Vic)); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from 
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This flurry of legislative activity was motivated primarily by a desire to rein in insurance 
premiums, which had increased dramatically. As a result of these reforms,9 tort law is no 
longer primarily a creation of the common law. Its contours are now at least as much a 
product of statutory provisions as rules that have their origin in the common law.  
When the Bill that became the Compensation Act 2006 (UK) was debated, it was 
tentatively suggested that provisions modelled on the Australian statutes should be introduced 
into it.10 However, this half-hearted proposal did not come to fruition. While the 
Compensation Act made certain adjustments to the law of torts,11 it did not go nearly as far as 
the Australian statutes. Pressure for further reform of tort law in Britain diminished following 
the enactment of the Compensation Act. There was a period of relative (or, merciful, some 
might say) quiet. However, this lull was short-lived. In 2009 the tort system caught the 
interest of the Conservatives, who were then in opposition. The Rt David Cameron MP asked 
his adviser on health and safety, the Rt Hon the Lord Young of Graffham PC, to report on the 
‘compensation culture’, which the Conservatives thought had been inadequately addressed by 
the Compensation Act, and to suggest ways of remedying it. Lord Young published his report, 
which has become known as the ‘Young Report’, in October 2010.12 The Young Report is not 
exclusively concerned with the tort system. Much of it addresses occupational health and 
safety laws. Nevertheless, certain of its recommendations are of considerable interest to tort 
scholars.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Liability) Act 2002 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) 
Act 2003 (NT); Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT). 
9  The word ‘reform’ sometimes implies a change for the better. I do not intend to convey this meaning when I 
use it in this article. By law ‘reform’, I mean any change in the law, positive or detrimental.  
10  See, e.g., HL Hansard, 20 Dec 2005, col GC258-271. 
11  For a useful discussion of the Act see A Morris, ‘The “Compensation Culture”’ in TT Arvind and J Steele 
(eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 15 (forthcoming). See also the 
discussion of the Bill that became the Act in K Williams, ‘Legislating in the Echo Chamber?’ (2005) 155 
NLJ 1938. 




This article offers an analysis of those parts of the Young Report that relate to tort law, 
including the procedure by which tort law is administered (which tort lawyers cannot afford to 
ignore).13 It does so in the light of the Australian reforms that have been mentioned. 
Assessing the Young Report from this perspective is illuminating for at least two reasons. 
First, it was seemingly influenced by events in Australia14 (although this was not 
acknowledged in it). Secondly, it reveals that the reform experiences in Britain and Australia 
have been quite different. Whereas the focus of the Australian legislatures has been on the 
substantive law of torts, including the law governing the assessment of damages, in Britain 
the concern has been primarily with the procedural regime by which tort law is governed (a 
trend continued by the Young Report). The waters of the substantive law of torts in Britain, as 
has been noted, are relatively unpolluted by statutory intervention. This difference, which has 
so far been overlooked by theorists, is noteworthy considering the similarity of the British 
legal system to that of Australia. It is a difference that calls for explanation. 
 
II TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TORT REFORM IN AUSTRALIA: AN OUTLINE 
  
(A) The 2001-2002 Insurance Crisis 
 
One of the most important issues in domestic politics in Australia at the start of the twenty-
first century was an ‘insurance crisis’. During 2001-2002, premiums for third-party insurance 
increased sharply, sometimes by several hundred per cent. These hikes, which were 
particularly pronounced in relation to medical indemnity and public liability insurance, had a 
profound impact on many facets of Australian society. Insurance became unaffordable for 
                                                 
13  It builds on a valuable analysis of the Report by Annette Morris, ‘“Common Sense Common Safety”: the 
Compensation Culture Perspective’ (2011) 27 PN 82. 
14  That Lord Young was cognisant of the Australian reforms is evident from the language he used in his Report. 
Certain turns of phrase found in the Australian legislation appear in the Young Report with sufficient 
regularity to exclude the possibility that their presence is a coincidence.  
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many or unavailable. Businesses were wound up.15 Social clubs closed.16 Children’s 
playgrounds and sports fields were cordoned off.17 Stretches of road were shut. Charitable 
events were cancelled. Medical practitioners, especially those working in the ‘high risk’ fields 
of obstetrics and neurosurgery, retired prematurely or threatened to do so (which had severe 
consequences for parts of rural Australia, where medical services were, and still are, in short 
supply).18 Even ANZAC Day (a national day of remembrance) commemorations19 and 
Christmas carols20 were jeopardised. Politicians quickly realised that something significant 
had to be done (and be seen to be done) to address this situation. 
 
(B) The Law of Torts Blamed 
 
The law of torts was widely blamed as the (or the main) cause of the insurance crisis. It 
quickly became intensely politicised as a result. The media enthusiastically condemned the 
system by parodying it and the judges who administered it.21 The public was inundated with 
of ‘horror stories’ (which were sometimes not even from Australia) that supposedly proved 
the litigiousness of Australians, their reluctance to accept ‘personal responsibility’ for their 
                                                 
15  ‘Businesses Under Pressure’, 28 March 2002, Canberra Times, 2; D Buttler and N Webber, ‘State of 
Despair: Insurance Crisis Costs Jobs, Festivals, Fun’, 27 June 2002, Herald Sun, 1. 
16  G Jacobsen, ‘Clubs, Charities Crippled as Premiums Soar’, 31 October 2001, Sydney Morning Herald, 3. 
17  ‘Field of Broken Dreams: Liability Bowls out Cricket Ground’, 12 August 2002, Daily Telegraph, 9. 
18  G Healy and S Stock, ‘Insurance is Ruining Us, Warn Doctors’, 4 December 2000, The Australian, 6. 
19  L Morris, ‘Liability Crisis has Light Horsemen Galloping for Cover’, 30 August 2002, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 6. 
20  ‘Insurance Crisis Kills Santa’, 29 August 2002, Daily Telegraph, 19; F Walker, ‘HIH Insurance Crisis 
Cancels Christmas’, 9 December 2001, Herald Sun, 18. 
21  Analyses of the warped picture that the Australian media painted of tort law are provided in K Burns, 
‘Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis: An Australian Perspective’ (2007) 15 TLJ 195 
and D Howard-Wagner, ‘Who are the Real “Heroes” and “Villains”: The Print Media’s Role in Constructing 
the “Public Liability Crisis” as a “Moral Panic Drama”’ (2006) 10 Newcastle L Rev 69. 
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conduct, the insatiable greed of lawyers, and that the tort system generally was 
dysfunctional.22  
Skirmishes between politicians, who widely believed the tort system to be responsible not 
only for the insurance crisis but for a litany of other problems in Australia, and claimant 
lawyers were regularly fought on television and radio shows, often at prime-time. Insurers, 
who organised themselves into a powerful lobby group, clamoured for change.23 Even judges 
weighed into the debate. For instance, at the height of the crisis the Chief Justice of 
New South Wales published a seminal article in which he argued that tort law was slanted too 
far in favour of claimants.24 His Honour called for ‘principles-based reform’ of tort law.  
 The legal profession vigorously disputed the suggestion that tort law had contributed 
materially to the insurance crisis.25 Associations representing the profession observed that 
there was no reliable evidence to warrant laying responsibility for the premium rises at tort 
law’s door.26 It was also pointed out that there had not been any recent developments in the 
law of torts that significantly increased insurers’ exposure. The ‘stretching’ of tort law in 
                                                 
22  A case on which the media focused was Swain v Waverley Municipal Council. The claimant in this litigation 
had been catastrophically injured when he dived under a wave at a beach for which the defendant Council 
was responsible and struck his head on a sandbank. A jury (a rarity in civil actions in Australia) held the 
defendant liable in negligence. A majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal set aside the jury’s 
verdict and entered judgment for the defendant: Waverley Municipal Council v Swain [2003] NSWCA 61; 
[2003] Aust Torts Rep 81-694. The claimant successfully appealed to the High Court of Australia: 
Swain v Waverley Municipal Council [2005] HCA 4; (2005) 220 CLR 517. 
23  See, for example, the following short article written by a senior representative of the insurance industry: A 
Mason, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Balancing Costs and Community Expectations’ (2002) 25 
UNSWLJ 831. 
24  JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’ (2002) 76 ALJ 432. See also 
JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence and Insurance Premiums: Recent Changes in Australia Law’ (2003) 11 TLJ 291; 
JJ Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’ (2006) 14 Tort L Rev 5. 
25  The views of the profession were expressed primarily via an association then known as the Australian 
Plaintiff Lawyers Association (‘APLA’) (it is now known as the Australian Lawyers Alliance). APLA 
contended that the premium hikes were due to a multitude of factors that were unrelated to the tort system, 
including the collapse of two major insurers, HIH and United Medical Protection Ltd, instability in the global 
financial markets following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, the rising 
cost of reinsurance, and the aggressive under-pricing of risks due to an overly competitive domestic 
insurance market.  
26  APLA, Inquiry to Review of the Law of Negligence: APLA Legal and Policy Submission (2002) at 18, 
<http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/subs/042Plaintiff.pdf>. See also Law Council of Australia, 
Submission by the Law Council of Australia to the Negligence Review Panel on the Review of the Law of 
Negligence (2002) at 3-4, <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/subs/033LCA3.pdf>. 
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Australia in favour of claimants, to use Professor Patrick Atiyah’s graphic phrase,27 had well 
and truly ceased by the start of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the High Court of Australia 
had been developing tort law in a decidedly pro-defendant fashion since approximately 
1999.28 Claimants had lost in a string of cases in that Court in the period leading up to the 
insurance crisis.29 In short, the view of the legal profession generally was that reform of tort 
law was unnecessary.  
 
(C) A Panel of Eminent Persons Convened 
 
In a rare display of unity, the governments of Australia co-operated to address the insurance 
crisis. They commissioned a Panel (known as the ‘Panel of Eminent Persons’) to advise them 
how to reform the tort of negligence in the context of actions for damages for personal injury 
and death. The Panel’s terms of reference required it to assume that ‘[t]he award of damages 
for personal injury ha[d] become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of 
compensation for those injured through the fault of another.’30 The Panel was asked to 
proceed on the footing that it was ‘desirable to examine a method for the reform of the 
common law with the objective of limiting liability and [sic] quantum of damages arising 
from personal injury and death.’31 Controversially, the Panel was not given a brief to consider 
whether tort law was causally related to the spike in insurance premiums.  
The Panel was chaired by the Hon Justice David Ipp AO, who was then an Acting Justice 
of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (an intermediate appellate 
                                                 
27  PS Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997).  
28  APLA, above n 26 at 16-18. 
29  This judicial reversal of the fortunes of claimants is described in H Luntz, ‘Torts Turnaround Downunder’ 
(2001) 1 OUCLJ 95. 
30  Ministerial Communiqué, Terms of Reference: Principles Based Review of the Law of Negligence 
by a Panel of Eminent Persons <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/termsofref.asp>.  
31  Ibid.  
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court in Australia). Its other members were Professor Peter Cane,32 a medical practitioner, and 
the mayor of a local council. The Panel was answerable to the Federal Minister for Revenue 
and Assistant Treasurer (the Hon Senator Helen Coonan MP) and based in, and serviced by, 
the Federal Treasury Department. Both its institutional link with the Federal Government and 
its composition sent strong messages. The Panel’s close tie with the Federal Government 
suggested that its role was to advise the Federal Government how to implement its stated 
policy, which was clearly articulated in the terms of reference, rather than to recommend how 
the law might be changed for the better, all things considered. Furthermore, the fact that the 
Panel was responsible not to the Federal Attorney-General but to a Treasury minister 
underscored the political perception that priority should be given to economic considerations 
rather than to broader concerns of justice. The composition of the Panel also reflected the 
prevailing political climate. The appointment of lay persons to it indicated a belief on the part 
of the legislatures that the Panel’s report should be suffused with community views. The fact 
that the lay members were representatives of the medical profession and local authorities 
suggested that the interests of these stakeholders (both of which had been severely affected by 
the insurance premium increases) should be given particular weight.33 These features of the 
Panel rendered it quite a different entity from a law reform commission.  
 
(D) The Ipp Report 
 
Because of the calamitous consequences that the insurance crisis was having for Australian 
society, the Panel was forced to work under severe time restraints. Its terms of reference were 
                                                 
32  Peter Cane wrote an article about the Panel’s role in the reform process: P Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in 
Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 MULR 649. 
33  Senator Coonan, announcing the Panel, said that the appointment to the Panel of the lay members would 
‘ensure that the views of medical practitioners and community organisations are fully taken into account’ 




issued on 2 July 2002.34 Following a consultation exercise, the Panel, as instructed, published 
its Interim Report on 30 August 200235 and its Final Report, which became known as the 
‘Ipp Report’, on 30 September 2002.36 The Ipp Report is 255 pages in length and contains 
61 recommendations. It is written in a scholarly style, although, understandably, it avoids 
getting draw into theoretical debates. All in all, it was a remarkable achievement. This is 
especially so given the brief period within which the Panel had to report to their political 
masters and the fact that the workload must have fallen primarily on its two legally-trained 
members.  
It is impractical and unnecessary to discuss the Panel’s recommendations in detail. 
However, it is convenient to briefly mention a selection of its proposals that are likely to be of 
particular interest to a British audience or which are essential to note in order to understand 
the Australian tort reform process. The Panel’s recommendations included the following: 
 Legislation resulting from its recommendations should be uniform across 
Australia.37  
 Legislation should provide that, in determining whether the reasonable person in 
the defendant’s position would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, it is 
relevant to consider (among other things): (i) the probability that the harm would 
occur if care was not taken; (ii) the likely seriousness of the harm if it occurred; 
(iii) the burden of taking precautions to avoid or reduce the risk of harm; and 
(iv) the social utility of the risk-creating activity.38 
                                                 
34  Ibid.  
35  Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Interim Report (2002) The Interim Report is 
available online: <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report/PDF/LawNegFull.pdf>. 
36  Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002). The Ipp Report 
incorporated the Interim Report. It is available online: 
<http://www.revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf>. 
37  Ipp Report, Recommendation 1. 
38  Ipp Report, Recommendation 28(d). In making this recommendation, the Panel did not intend to change the 
common law. The four factors that it identified as being relevant to whether the defendant acted negligently 
are criteria that the common law regards as material: see Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; 
(1980) 146 CLR 40. Rather the Panel’s hope was that, by reducing these factors to a statutory formula, 
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 The Bolam39 test should be adopted in medical malpractice cases in which the 
allegation of negligence relates to treatment (as opposed to a failure to inform the 
claimant of risks of injury).40 (The Bolam test had been rejected by the High Court 
of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker.41 In that case, the High Court held that the 
ordinary rules concerning the standard of care applied in professional negligence 
cases.)  
 The immunity of highway authorities for non-feasance (which the High Court 
abolished in 2001,42 much to the dismay of politicians) should not be restored.43 
 Providers of ‘recreational services’ should be given immunity in respect of 
liability resulting from the materialisation of an ‘obvious risk’ of injury in their 
services.44  
 The common law regarding the liability of not-for-profit organisations should not 
be changed.45 Nor should any adjustment be made to the law concerning 
Good Samaritans.  
 Legislation should authorise findings of 100 per cent contributory negligence.46 
(The High Court of Australia had held that findings of contributory negligence 
were impermissible.47) 
 Only those claimants who are ‘15 per cent of a most extreme case’ should be 
entitled to general damages.48  
                                                                                                                                                        
judges would be more likely to pay closer attention to factors that militate against finding that the defendant 
acted unreasonably: Ipp Report at 106 [7.17]. 
39  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (CA); [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
40  Ipp Report, Recommendation 3. 
41  [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
42  Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29; (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
43  Ipp Report at 152 [10.5].  
44  Ipp Report, Recommendation 11. 
45  Ipp Report, Recommendations 10 and 16.  
46  Ipp Report, Recommendation 31.  
47  Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 52; (1997) 72 ALJR 65. 
48  Ipp Report, Recommendation 47.  
11 
 Damages for a loss of earnings per week should be capped at twice average full-
time adult ordinary time weekly earnings in Australia49 (at the date the Ipp Report 
was published, this proposal would have resulted in a cap of AUD$1744.8050 
(roughly £1130)). 
 The discount rate applicable to damages for future economic loss should be 
three per cent.51 (This is the Australian common law rate.52 In most Australian 
jurisdictions, a higher rate, usually five per cent, had been set in many contexts.) 
 Exemplary and aggravated damages should be abolished.53  
 
(E) The Legislative Reaction54 
 
It is a notorious fact that recommendations for the reform of the law frequently fall on deaf 
ears.55 This was not the case with respect to the proposals for change contained in the 
Ipp Report. In some jurisdictions, such as New South Wales and Queensland, many of its 
recommendations were swiftly enacted,56 essentially verbatim. The legislatures in other 
                                                 
49  Ipp Report, Recommendation 49.  
50  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings Australia, Table 3: Average Weekly Earnings, 
Australian (Dollars) – Original (Reference 6302.0). 
51  Ipp Report, Recommendation 53.  
52  Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402. 
53  Ipp Report, Recommendation 60.  
54  Numerous articles discuss the legislation enacted in the wake of the Ipp Report. For a small sampling see 
DA Ipp, ‘Negligence –– Where Lies the Future?’ (2003) 23 ABR 158; Spigelman (2003), above n 24; 
Spigelman (2006), above n 24; B McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The 
Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27 Syd LR 443; B McDonald, 
‘The Impact of the Civil Liability Legislation on Fundamental Policies and Principles of the Common Law of 
Negligence’ (2006) 14 TLJ 268; J Keeler, ‘Personal Responsibility and the Reform Recommended by the Ipp 
Report: “Time Future Contained in Time Past”’ (2006) 14 TLJ 48. 
55  The Law Commission Act 2009 (UK), which amends the Law Commission Act 1965 (UK), attempts to rectify 
this situation. It requires the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament annually on the extent to which the Law 
Commission’s proposals have been implemented: see Law Commission Act 1965 (UK), s 3A. See also the 
Protocol between the Lord Chancellor and the Law Commission agreed pursuant to s 3B(1): Law 
Commission, Protocol Between the Lord Chancellor (on Behalf of the Government) and the Law 
Commission, Report 321 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010) at 6 [18]-[22]. This Protocol relevantly 
requires the government to correspond with the Commission following the publication of a report regarding 
its implementation.  
56  Indeed, the governments in some jurisdictions did not wait for the Ipp Report to be published. 
Controversially, the New South Wales government began its reform process before the Ipp Panel had been 
12 
 
jurisdictions, such as the Territories, were more discriminating and only implemented a 
handful of the Ipp Report’s recommendations.  
All of the legislatures enacted provisions to address issues that were not discussed in the 
Ipp Report. For example, in all States and Territories save for Victoria and Western Australia, 
potent illegality defences were enacted.57 These defences were created in response to a 
misguided belief that the common law routinely enables persons injured while committing a 
criminal offence to profit from their wrongdoing.58 The case for creating them was not 
considered in the Ipp Report. Likewise, in New South Wales,59 Queensland,60 
Western Australia61 and the Northern Territory,62 provisions restricting or prohibiting lawyers 
from advertising personal injury services were introduced.63 Again, these controls were 
created without the benefit of advice from the Ipp Panel.  
                                                                                                                                                        
convened. The Civil Liability Bill 2002 (NSW) was read for the first time on 28 May 2002 (the Federal 
Government did not announce the composition of the Panel until 2 July 2002: Part II(C)).  
57  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 54-54A; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 43; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 94; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 
(NT), s 10. No equivalent provision exists in Victoria or Western Australia. However, s 14G(2) of the 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides: ‘In determining whether the plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of 
care owed by the defendant, the court must consider … whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal 
activity.’ This provision does not create a defence in the strict sense. Rather, the claimant’s illegal act is 
merely a consideration to be borne in mind for the purposes of the negligence ‘calculus’. 
58  The political focus was on a decision of the District Court of New South Wales (Fox v Peakhurst Inn Pty Ltd 
(unreported, District Court of New South Wales, McGuire DCJ, 29 August 2002)) to award nearly 
AUD$50,000 (roughly £33,000) to an inebriated teenager who had been badly beaten by an occupier with a 
metal bar. This beating occurred when the teenager, having been denied entry into a night club because he 
was intoxicated and under-age, endeavoured to locate alternative access to the club via the occupier’s 
adjoining premises. The teenager’s mother recovered AUD$18,578 (approximately £12,000) in respect of a 
psychiatric injury that she suffered upon seeing her son in hospital. This decision was set aside by New South 
Wales Court of Appeal on procedural grounds: Fox v Peakhurst Inn Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 74. The 
defendant apparently lost on the retrial: V Goldner, ‘Drunk Youth gets Payout Back’, 18 December 2004, 
Daily Telegraph, 26. I provided a review of the statutory illegality defences in J Goudkamp, ‘A Revival of 
the Doctrine of Attainder? The Statutory Illegality Defences to Liability in Tort’ (2007) 29 Syd LR 445. See 
also J Goudkamp, ‘Self-Defence and Illegality Under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’ (2010) 18 TLJ 61.  
59  Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 85(1)(d); Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW), Pt 5, Div 2. 
60  Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), ss 64-66. 
61  Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 16-18. 
62  Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT), ss 288-291. 
63  The constitutional validity of the New South Wales restrictions were tested in the High Court of Australia: 
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322. The main argument in 
support of the suggested invalidity of the restrictions was that they infringed the implied constitutional 
freedom to communication on political and governmental matters (which had been recognised by the High 
Court in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 117 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television 




Not only did all State and Territory legislatures engage in legislative experimentation, but 
they positively disregarded certain of the Panel’s recommendations. Consider the following 
four examples. First, and most notably, they ignored the Panel’s eminently sensible 
recommendation that any legislation enacted to address the insurance crisis should be 
consistent across Australia. Unfortunately, there are significant variations in the legislation 
between jurisdictions.64 Secondly, contrary to the Panel’s advice, in all jurisdictions certain 
not-for-profit organisations (or ‘volunteers’) were provided ‘good faith’ defences65 and ‘Good 
Samaritans’ with immunity.66 Thirdly, in all jurisdictions except for the Northern Territory, 
the immunity of highway authorities was resurrected in modified form.67 The Panel expressly 
counselled against reviving the immunity.68 Finally, the advice in the Ipp Report with respect 
to the discount rate was ignored by all of the legislatures other than that of the Australian 
Capital Territory. A rate of five per cent was generally adopted.69 In the Australian Capital 
Territory, the common law rate of three per cent70 already applied. This was left undisturbed. 
 
                                                 
64  The extent of the discrepancies is surveyed in D Butler, ‘A Comparison of the Adoption of the Ipp Report 
Recommendations and Other Personal Injuries Liability Reforms’ (2005) 13 TLJ 201.  
65  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 61; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 39; Volunteers Protection Act 
2001 (SA), s 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s 47; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 37; Volunteers and Food and 
Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA), s 6; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 8; 
Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 7. See generally M McGregor-Lowndes and 
L Nguyen, ‘Volunteers and the New Tort Law Reform’ (2005) 13 TLJ 1. 
66  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 25-27; Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (SA), s 74; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 35A-35C; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 31A-31C; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5AB-5AE; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5; Personal Injuries 
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8.  
67  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 45; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 37; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 42; 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 42; Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 102; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), 
s 5Z; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 113. 
68  See above the text accompanying n 43.  
69  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14 (five per cent); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57 (five per cent); Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 3, 55 (five per cent); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28A (five per cent); Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I (five per cent); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 5 (six per 
cent); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22 (five per cent).  
70  See above the text accompanying n 51. 
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(F) The Resulting Statutory Chaos 
 
As a result of the legislative reaction to the insurance crisis, Australia now has a spectacularly 
complicated tort system. Each jurisdiction has a unique set of rules (which is a nightmare for 
academics writing about the Australian law of torts, if such a thing still exists). And, within 
each jurisdiction, it is common to find a litany of schemes that establish different rules for 
different types of cases. For instance, in New South Wales the legislation enacted in the wake 
of the Ipp Report added to statutes governing compensation in the contexts of motor vehicle 
accidents71 and workers’ compensation.72 This ‘hodge-podge’73 of statutes is pregnant with 
the potential to cause significant injustice. A claimant tortiously injured in, say, a motor 
vehicle accident, may receive treatment altogether different from a claimant who suffers 
identical loss due to the carelessness of a provider of a recreational service. Similarly, a 
person hurt as a result of the wrongdoing of another in one State may recover several hundred 
thousand dollars more or less than an identically injured person in another State. In short, tort 
law in Australia is now chaotically fragmented both inter-jurisdictionally and intra-
jurisdictionally. 
 
(G) The Impact of the Statutory Changes  
 
Reliable data regarding the effect of the tort reforms on third-party insurance premiums are 
not available74 (although anecdotal evidence suggests that premiums have returned 
approximately to levels seen before the 2001-2002 insurance crisis). However, the impact of 
                                                 
71  Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW). 
72  Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). 
73  The description is Ipp JA’s: Landon v Ferguson [2005] NSWCA 395; (2005) 64 NSWLR 131 at 135 [17]. 
74  Data regarding premiums were not systematically collected before the 2001-2002 insurance crisis. Since 
2003, a national insurance database, the ‘National Claims and Policies Database’ has been maintained by the 




the changes made to the tort system in Australia in the wake of the Ipp Report is clearly 
visible in the number of personal injury claims filed.75 It is convenient to look at the data for 
the civil jurisdiction of the New South Wales District Court (New South Wales is the most 
populous state in Australia, and the civil jurisdiction of its District Court, which is roughly 
equivalent in institutional terms to the English County Court, deals almost exclusively with 
personal injury cases). In 2001, filings were 20,784.76 This figure fell to 12,686 in 2002 and 
then to 7,912 in 2003. In 2004, only 6,789 claims were filed.77 These are obviously very 
profound changes.78 There is no doubt that they were due to the legislation enacted following 
the Ipp Report. 
 
(H) The Future 
 
The statutory changes in Australia have, on the whole, been condemned by academics.79 
Many judges have been critical of them too. One prominent judge, now the Governor of 
Tasmania, wrote that the reforms were ‘hasty and ill-considered reactions to the so-called 
insurance crisis’.80 Justice Ipp complained that some of the statutory changes went too far and 
suggested that they will probably be wound back, quietly and gradually. His Honour wrote: ‘It 
is difficult to accept that public sentiment will allow all these changes to remain long-term 
                                                 
75  A detailed survey of these statistics in all jurisdictions is provided in EW Wright, ‘National Trends in 
Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After “Ipp”’ (2006) 14 TLJ 233. 
76  District Court of New South Wales, Annual Review 2003 at Annexure A1.  
77  District Court of New South Wales, Annual Review 2004 at Annexure A1.  
78  The personal injury Bar in New South Wales was decimated as a result. Many sets of barristers’ chambers 
closed following the legislative reforms. The New South Wales government was even lobbied by the 
profession to create a ‘rescue package’ for unemployed lawyers. This was wishful thinking: see A Mitchell, 
‘Get Over It, Carr Tells Jobless Lawyers’ 7 December 2003, Sun Herald, 21. 
79  Withering criticisms include NJ Mullany, ‘Tort Reform and the Damages Dilemma’ (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 
876; H Luntz, ‘The Australian Picture’ (2004) 35 VUWLR 879; McDonald (2006), above n 54; A Field, 
‘“There Must be a Better Way”: Personal Injuries Compensation since the “Crisis in Insurance”’ (2008) 13 
Deakin LR 67. 
80  P Underwood, ‘Is Ms Donoghue’s Snail in Mortal Peril?’ (2004) 12 TLJ 1 at 22.  
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features of the law. Certain of the statutory barriers that plaintiffs now face are inordinately 
high.’81  
It seems reasonably likely that at least some of the more severe provisions will slowly be 
softened or repealed as the insurance crisis fades from Australia’s political memory. One 
interesting recent development, which may be a reaction to the harshness of the post-Ipp 
reforms, is that context-specific no-fault compensation schemes are on the rise. For instance, a 
no-fault system for persons catastrophically injured in motor vehicle accidents was quietly 
established in New South Wales in 2006.82 The Federal Government recently briefed the 
Australian Productivity Commission, an economic advisory body, to inquire into establishing 
a disability care and support scheme.83 The Commission recommended that a national 





In contrast with the glacial pace at which law reform typically occurs, all Australian 
governments rapidly altered tort system at the start of the twenty-first century. These changes, 
which primarily concerned the substantive law of torts (including its remedial system) rather 
than the procedure by which it is administered, were severely restrictive of the ability of 
claimants to recover compensation. They were made with a view to reducing insurance 
premiums. Central to the reform process was a report, the Ipp Report, commissioned by the 
                                                 
81  D Ipp, ‘The Metamorphosis of Slip and Fall’ (2007) 29 ABR 150 at 150. 
82  Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW). This scheme operates in tandem with a fault-
based system: see Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).  
83  The Terms of Reference are available online: <http://uat.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-support/terms-
of-reference>. 
84  Productivity Commission, Disability Care and Support (Melbourne: Productivity Commission, 2011). The 
Commission’s report is available online: <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-support/report>. 
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governments of Australia. The reforms resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of 
filings of actions for damages in respect of personal injury and death.  
 
III THE YOUNG REPORT 
 
This part of this article examines the Young Report. Comparisons will be drawn with the 
Ipp Report and the tort reform process in Australia where appropriate.  
 
(A) The Political Context 
 
In order to properly understand the Young Report, it is essential to appreciate the political 
environment in which it exists. The Conservatives commissioned the Young Report because 
they (like the other major parties) believed that Britain was in the grip of a ‘compensation 
culture’. Although a 2006 report by the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee 
concluded that there was no ‘compensation culture’ in Britain,85 in his Foreword to the 
Young Report the Prime Minister claimed: ‘A damaging compensation culture has arisen, as if 
people can absolve themselves from any personal responsibility for their own actions, with 
the spectre of lawyers only too willing to pounce with a claim for damages on the slightest 
pretext.’ This ungrammatical piece of rhetoric, which was not supported by any empirical 
evidence to contradict the findings of the 2006 report, contains many phrases that are familiar 
to Australian lawyers: ‘compensation culture’, ‘personal responsibility’ and the spectre of 
‘greedy lawyers’. These catch-cries were ubiquitous in the Australian media in the period 
preceding the publication of the Ipp Report.86  
                                                 
85  House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of Session 2005-
2006, vol 1, HC 754-I (London: The Stationery Office, 2006) at 13 [31] (‘the evidence does not support the 
view that increased litigation has created a “compensation culture”’).  
86  See above Part II(B). 
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Unfortunately, the difficulty that the Conservatives (and their Liberal Democrat partners) 
have with the supposed ‘compensation culture’ is not entirely clear.87 They do not, apparently, 
see it as objectionable on the ground that it places upwards pressure on insurance premiums. 
They could not take issue with the ‘compensation culture’ on this basis since there is not an 
insurance crisis in Britain.88 It is true that there has been some unease about recent premium 
spikes in specific contexts, such as in relation to motor vehicle insurance.89 But there is no 
doubt that the situation in Britain with respect to premiums is radically different from that 
which existed in Australia in the period preceding the publication of the Ipp Report. Rather, it 
seems that the main objection to the ‘compensation culture’ is that it provokes excessive 
caution and encourages defensive practices.  
 
(B) The Terms of Reference 
 
Lord Young’s terms of reference relevantly stated:90 ‘To investigate and report back to the 
Prime Minister on the rise of the compensation culture over the last decade coupled with the 
current low standing that health and safety legislation now enjoys and to suggest solutions.’ 
Two points are worth noting in this regard. First, Lord Young was permitted to consider the 
entirety of the law of torts and, indeed, all other fields in so far as they relate to the 
‘compensation culture’. His remit also allowed him to consider the causes of the 
                                                 
87  Several reasons why politicians might find the ‘compensation culture’ to be problematic are canvassed in 
R Mullender, ‘Blame Culture and Political Debate: Finding our way Through the Fog’ (2011) 27 PN 64. 
88  Although the government has recently investigated insurance premiums several times: Department for Work 
and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insurance: Second Stage Report (London: 
Department for Work and Pensions, 2003); Office of Fair Trading, Liability Insurance (London: Office of 
Fair Trading, 2003); Better Regulation Task Force, Better Routes to Redress (London: Cabinet Office 
Publications, 2004) at 6; Office of Fair Trading, The UK Liability Insurance Market (London: Office of Fair 
Trading, 2005).  
89  For example, between March 2010 and March 2011 premiums for young drivers were reported to have 
increased by up to 64 per cent. For other drivers, the cost of cover rose by up to 40 per cent. See D Prosser, 
‘How Motor Insurers Drove Premiums to an All-Time High’, 9 September 2011, The Independent, 33. See 
further House of Commons Transport Committee, The Cost of Motor Insurance: Fourth Report of Session 
2010–2011, vol I, HC 591 (London: The Stationery Office, 2011). 
90  Young Report, Annex A.  
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‘compensation culture’. The terms of reference issued to the Ipp Panel were quite different.91 
The Ipp Panel, recall, was requested to consider only the action in negligence in so far as it 
applied to personal injury and death. It was also forced to accept that tort law was the root of 
the problem to be addressed. Secondly, the terms of reference required Lord Young to assume 
that a ‘compensation culture’ exists. He was not briefed with the task of determining whether 
there was in fact a ‘compensation culture’. Given the contentiousness of this issue, it is 
regrettable that the terms of reference did not permit Lord Young to investigate whether 
Britain in fact suffers from a ‘compensation culture’.  
 
(C) Lord Young 
 
It is useful to briefly reflect on the significance of the fact that Lord Young, a Tory peer, was 
assigned with responsibility for investigating the ‘compensation culture’ and identifying 
means of addressing it. Lord Young qualified as a lawyer and practised for a brief period 
early in his working life. He then left the law to pursue a career in business and then in 
politics. He was a cabinet minister in the Thatcher Government and subsequently served in an 
advisory capacity for the Conservatives. What, if anything, can be read into the fact that 
Lord Young was requested to advise the government how to tackle the ‘compensation 
culture’, rather than, say, the Law Commission? Arguably, it suggests the existence of a belief 
on the part of the Conservatives that ‘compensation culture’ should be addressed in a 
pragmatic way. The Prime Minister referred in his Foreword to the need for ‘common sense’ 
in the law. Economic factors, rather than wider considerations of justice, were also seen as 
particularly significant. Again, the Prime Minister claimed that the relevant law was 
bureaucratic and (in a mixed-metaphor) that businesses were being ‘drowned in red tape’. 
                                                 
91  See above Part II(B). 
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Finally, the fact that Lord Young was briefed as opposed to the Law Commission suggests 
that the Conservatives thought that the ‘compensation culture’ was a reasonably urgent 
problem. The Law Commission typically takes two or three years to publish a final report 
from the date that a project is referred to it. Presumably, the Conservatives were not prepared 
to wait this long. If the foregoing interpretation of the Conservatives’ motives for briefing 
Lord Young is correct, the Young Report shares a number of features in common with the 
Ipp Report.92  
 
(D) The Nature of the Young Report 
 
The fact that the author of the Young Report is a politician is immediately obvious upon even 
a cursory reading of it. It is replete with political slogans and written in emotive and often 
ungrammatical language. The Report’s recommendations are generally vague and it is 
difficult to determine precisely what changes are proposed. Indeed, it is at times unclear 
whether a change to the law is even being recommended. The Report is almost devoid of 
references to the case law or to legislation and it contains many tell-tale signs that its author 
had a relatively poor understanding of the tort system (several of which will be noted when 
the Report’s recommendations are discussed93). In these respects, the Young Report is 
decidedly amateurish compared with the Ipp Report. The fact that changes to important parts 
of tort law are being contemplated on the basis of the Young Report is, therefore, a cause for 
alarm. Proposals for reform that are made without the benefit of a proper understanding of the 
current state of the law run a significant risk of altering it for the worse.  
 
                                                 
92  See above Part II(C). 
93  See below Part II(F). 
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(E) The ‘Compensation Culture’94 
 
The phrase ‘compensation culture’ is used in at least five ways in academic and lay writing 
about the law. First, it may indicate that too many lawsuits are being commenced.95 Secondly, 
a ‘compensation culture’ may refer to a society in which damages awards are frequently 
excessive relative to some benchmark, such as the gravity of the defendant’s wrongdoing or 
the severity of the claimant’s injuries. Thirdly, the words ‘compensation culture’ may mean 
that a substantial number of claims are fraudulent.96 Fourthly, a ‘compensation culture’ may 
refer to an undesirable readiness of sections of the public or the public generally to seek legal 
redress of their grievances.97 Fifthly, a ‘compensation culture’ may be a society in which legal 
redress for injuries is too readily available.  
 A serious defect in the Young Report is that it does not identify the sense in which it uses 
the term ‘compensation culture’. Consider the following passage in the Report:98  
                                                 
94  A great deal has been written on the subject of the compensation culture: see, e.g., Atiyah, above n 27 at 47-
50, 138-143, 157-158; R Lewis, A Morris and K Oliphant, ‘Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is there a 
Compensation Culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 14 TLJ 158; A Morris, ‘Spiralling or Stabilising? 
The Compensation Culture and Our Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal Injury’ (2007) 70 MLR 349; 
Morris, above n 11; J Hand, ‘The Compensation Culture: Cliché or Cause for Concern?’ (2010) 37 JLS 569; 
R Mullender, ‘Negligence Law and Blame Culture: A Critical Response to a Possible Problem’ (2006) 22 PN 
2; Mullender, above n 87; HA Williams, ‘Compensation Culture: A Storm in a Coffee Cup’ (2011) 1 SSLR 
1; K Williams, ‘State of Fear: Britain’s “Compensation Culture” Reviewed’ (2005) 25 LS 499. 
95  Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, then the Lord Chief Justice, understood the phrase ‘compensation culture’ 
to bear this meaning when he gave evidence to the Constitutional Affairs Committee in 2005. When asked 
whether a ‘compensation culture’ existed, Lord Phillips replied in the negative and referred to statistics 
indicating that the number of claims had fallen in recent years: House of Commons Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of Session 2005-2006, vol 2, HC 754-II (London: The 
Stationery Office, 2006) at Ev 1. 
96  See, e.g., Lewis, Morris and Oliphant, above n 94 at 175 (the phrase ‘compensation culture’ ‘insinuates that a 
significant proportion of claims are fraudulent, exaggerated or otherwise lacking in merit’). 
97  See, eg., K Williams, above n 94 at 500 (‘The growth of a “compensation culture” implies an increased and 
unreasonable willingness to seek legal redress when things go wrong’ (footnote omitted)); J Lowe, 
J Broughton, B Gravelsons, C Hensman, J Rakow, M Malone, G Mitchell and S Shah, The Cost of 
Compensation Culture (London: Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, 2002) at Section 2.1 (a ‘compensation 
culture’ is a culture in which there is a ‘desire of individuals to sue somebody, having suffered as a result of 
something which could have been avoided if the sued body had done their job properly’); Hand, above n 94 
at 575-576 (in a ‘compensation culture’ ‘people are more likely to “blame and claim” or “have a go” rather 
than display a reasonable level of stoicism’).  
98  Young Report, Foreword by Lord Young.  
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‘I believe that a “compensation culture” driven by litigation is at the heart of the 
problems that so beset health and safety today. [In 2009] over 800,000 compensation 
claims were made in the UK while stories of individuals suing their employers for 
disproportionately large sums of money for personal injury claims, often for the most 
trivial of reasons, are a regular feature in our newspapers.’ 
In this extract, Lord Young conflates at least three of the five identified meanings of the 
phrase ‘compensation culture’. In referring to the number of lawsuits, he implies that there is 
a ‘compensation culture’ in the first sense. He then uses the term in the second sense by 
asserting that damages awards are disproportionate (he does not identify the criterion 
according to which proportionality is assessed). Finally, he suggests that many claims are 
frivolous and thereby alludes to the fourth (and perhaps also to the fifth) definition of a 
‘compensation culture’. With respect, this situation is unsatisfactory. Before proposals for 
addressing a putative problem with the law are made, proponents for change should identify 
the suggested problem with reasonable precision. A failure to do so is prone to result in 
changes being made that fail to hit their target.  
 Next observe that Lord Young fails to realise that, on some of these definitions, it is 
impossible to ascertain whether a ‘compensation culture’ exists. He refers to the fact that over 
800,000 claims for compensation were made in 2009. He evidently thought that this proves 
that there are too many claims in Britain. What, however, is a non-excessive level of 
claiming? No sensible answer can be given to this question. Asserting that 800,000 claims is 
an excessive is neither more nor less defensible than asserting that 600,000 claims or a million 
claims is excessive.  
 The difficulties with the Young Report’s analysis of the ‘compensation culture’ do not end 
here. Incredibly, Lord Young vacillated on the issue of whether there is in fact a 
‘compensation culture’. In the passage quoted above, Lord Young indicates that he believed 
23 
 
that a ‘compensation culture’ exists. However, later in his Report he wrote that ‘[t]he problem 
of the compensation culture prevalent in society today is ... one of perception rather than 
reality’.99 It is also worth noting that the latter claim contradicts the terms of reference, which 
required Lord Young to assume that Britain is labouring under a ‘compensation culture’.100  
 
(F) The Recommendations for Reform  
 
Preceding sections dealt with the background and context of the Young Report. Attention will 
now be turned to the recommendations that Lord Young made that are relevant to tort 
lawyers.  
 
(i) Good Samaritans 
 
According to Lord Young, the public believes that Good Samaritans are not infrequently held 
liable when their conduct causes injury.101 To support this proposition, Lord Young referred 
to advice given on radio and television shows to homeowners during the 2009-2010 Winter 
that they should not clear snow in front of their homes as doing so might expose them to 
liability to passersby who slip and fall. Lord Young accepted that this public perception of the 
law is inaccurate.102 As every lawyer knows, the law treats Good Samaritans sympathetically 
so as not to discourage altruism. The courts are reluctant to hold them liable in negligence103 
                                                 
99  Young Report at 19. 
100  See above Part III(B). 
101  Young Report at 23. 
102  Lord Young thought that the perception had arisen ‘largely because in the USA Good Samaritans are often 
liable’. In reaching this conclusion, Lord Young fell prey to a familiar myth about tort law in the United 
States. Good Samaritans generally enjoy greater protection from liability in the United States than they do in 
Britain. In many jurisdictions in the United States, Good Samaritans have been conferred with immunity. See 
DB Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St Paul MN: West Group, 2000) at 663-664. See also at 306-307, 339. 
103  Authorities are collected in C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Flemings the Law of Torts (Sydney: Law Book 
Co/Thomson Reuters, 10th edn, 2011) at 136. 
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(or find that they are guilty contributory negligence104 or that they assumed the risk of 
injury105). However, Lord Young thought that it was important to give the public greater 
confidence on this score. Accordingly, he recommended that it be clarified that ‘people will 
not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their 
part.’106 
 Four points should be noted in this connection. First, the relevant law is already admirably 
clear. Enacting legislation in this connection entails the risk of making it less certain. 
Secondly, Lord Young thought that this recommendation, if implemented, would not change 
the law. On this point, he was badly mistaken. At present, Good Samaritans are obliged to 
take reasonable care for the safety of those to whom they owe a duty. Lord Young’s 
recommendation, if adopted, would confer Good Samaritans with immunity for acts 
performed in good faith, as has been done in many Australian jurisdictions.107 Thirdly, it is far 
from clear that Good Samaritans should be granted immunity. If Good Samaritans are 
bestowed with immunity, the only people who will be shielded from liability who are not 
already protected from it are Good Samaritans who act with reckless disregard for the welfare 
of others. It seems unlikely that that this is a sensible position for the law to adopt. Fourthly, 
Lord Young failed to realise that the public’s misperception of the law regarding Good 
Samaritans will not be corrected by reducing the law to statutory form. The fact of the matter 
is that legislation is not read by the general public. The problem needs to be addressed by 
targeting the cause of the public’s misperception, which is primarily misleading and 
irresponsible media reporting.  
 
                                                 
104  Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA); [1959] 3 All ER 225. 
105  Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA); Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA); [1959] 
3 All ER 225. The interests of Good Samaritans are promoted in various other ways. For instance, in order to 
facilitate their compensation in the event that they are injured, their conduct is not usually treated as an 
intervening cause: for detailed discussion see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm at § 32. 
106  Young Report at 23. 
107  See above Part II(E). 
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(ii) Advertising legal services 
 
Today, the advertisement of personal injury litigation services by both lawyers and claims 
management companies (‘CMCs’) is commonplace. In an attempt to curb the worst perceived 
excesses of such advertising, the Blair Government created a special regulatory regime for 
CMCs in Part 2 of the Compensation Act 2006 (UK).108 In general terms,109 this regime 
requires CMCs to apply for authorisation before operating and to abide by a code of 
conduct.110 This code states that their advertising must comply with general rules of 
advertising published by various regulators. Furthermore, CMCs are banned from engaging in 
‘high pressure selling’, cold calling, advertising in medical or public buildings without the 
consent of the management of the facility or building, and offering immediate cash or similar 
benefits as an inducement for making a claim. 
 The Young Report proposes that the advertising of personal injury litigation services be 
further restricted (specifics regarding the appropriate additional restrictions were not given)111 
on the ground that such advertising contributes to the ‘compensation culture’. The Young 
Report’s logic in this connection is not without difficulty. For one thing, it is unclear whether 
the advertising in question is behind the rise of the ‘compensation culture’.112 It has been 
                                                 
108  Several Australian governments have also restricting the advertisement of personal injury litigation services: 
see above Part II(E). 
109  What follows here is an abbreviated description of this complex regulatory system. A full understanding of 
this regime necessitates consideration not only of Pt 2 of the Compensation Act, but also of various 
regulations and statutory orders made pursuant to Pt 2, including The Compensation (Claims Management 
Services) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/3322), The Compensation (Regulated Claims Management Services) 
Order 2006 (SI 2006/3319), and the Compensation (Exemptions) Order 2007 (SI 2007/209). 
110 Ministry of Justice, Conduct of Authorised Persons Rules 2007 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007). The code 
is accessible online: <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/inspection-monitoring/claims-
management-regulation/conduct-of-authorised-persons-rules2007.pdf>. 
111  Young Report at 20-21. 
112  An empirical study of the effect of legal services advertising on the ‘compensation culture’ was undertaken 
on behalf of the Government in 2006: Department for Constitutional Affairs, Effects of Advertising in 
Respect of Compensation Claims for Personal Injuries (London: Millward Brown, 2006). This report 
concluded that ‘no straightforward link has been identified’ between legal services advertising and the 
‘compensation culture’ (at 3).  
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permissible for lawyers to advertise their services since the mid 1980s.113 The ‘compensation 
culture’ is, apparently, a much more recent phenomenon.114  
 The previous point aside, it is quite impossible for restricting or prohibiting legal services 
advertising to ameliorate the ‘compensation culture’ on some meanings of this concept.115 For 
example, it was noted above that a ‘compensation culture’ may mean, and Lord Young in his 
Report on occasion uses it to mean, a society in which that damages awards are frequently 
excessive relative to some standard. Limited or banning advertising would do nothing to 
reduce the quantum of awards. Advertising simply has no effect on the rules governing the 
assessment of damages.  
 A further difficulty with Lord Young’s analysis in this connection is that no weight is 
given to the disadvantages of restricting or prohibiting legal services advertising. There is 
insufficient space available to consider comprehensively these drawbacks in this article.116 In 
brief, however, restricting legal services advertising would arguably be undesirable for several 
reasons. It may reduce the speed with which facts in issue in litigation are investigated with 
adverse consequences for the accuracy of judicial determinations, limit consumer choice, raise 
the costs to consumers of finding a lawyer, and reduce public knowledge of the law. It is 
necessary for these and other considerations to be weighed before any action is taken to 
restrict legal services advertising. Even if such advertising has contributed to the 
‘compensation culture’ or has other unwanted consequences, it does not follow that it should 
                                                 
113  An excellent discussion of the lifting of the ban on lawyer advertising is L Hill, Publicity Rules of the Legal 
Professions Within the United Kingdom’ (2003) 20 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 323, especially at 336-342. See 
also J Lowe and F Stephen, ‘Deregulation and Professional Boundaries: Evidence from the English Legal 
Profession’ (1997) 26 Business and Economic History 792.  
114  One commentator’s research reveals that the term ‘compensation culture’ did not feature in the British media 
until the mid 1990s: Hand above n 94 at 569.  
115  Meanings attributed to the phrase ‘compensation culture’ are enumerated above in Part III(E). 
116  An immense literature exists regarding the desirability of permitting lawyers to advertise. Contributions 
include: G Hazard, R Pearce, J Stempel, ‘Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis 
of Legal Services’ (1983) 58 NYULR 1084; M Walker, ‘Advertising by Lawyers: Some Pros and Cons’ 
(1979) 55 Chi-Kent L Rev 407; R Cebula, ‘Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely Influence the Image of 
Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New Empirical Evidence’ (1998) 27 JLS 503; 
Note, ‘Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession’s Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available’ (1972) 81 
Yale LJ 1181.  
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be banned or restricted. It may be that the adverse ramifications of legal services advertising 
are worth tolerating.  
 Finally, it should be noted that the ability of the government to restrict legal services 
advertising might be limited by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which guarantees freedom of expression.117 The experience in the United States in this 
connection is significant. In that country, lawyer advertising is constitutionally protected as a 
form of ‘commercial speech’ under the First Amendment.118 Given the growing interest of 
British courts in First Amendment jurisprudence119 and their tendency to strengthen the 
protection given to freedom of expression, it is far from inconceivable that Article 10 would 
put a brake on attempts to further restrict legal services advertising in this jurisdiction.120 This 
possibility was not appreciated by Lord Young.  
                                                 
117  Article 10(1) relevantly provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.’  
118  See especially Florida Bar v Went For It, Inc., 515 US 618 (1995). See further K Sullivan, ‘The Intersection 
of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights’ (1998) 67 
Fordham L Rev 569. Cf the constitutional position on legal services advertising in Australia: see above 63. 
119  First Amendment jurisprudence was until relatively recently essentially ignored by British courts. References 
are now made to it with some regularity: see, e.g., R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312 at 1353 [47]; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) 
[2001] QB 967 (CA) at 1004 [135]; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 (PC) at 708; Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) at 218.  
120  Article 10(1) is qualified by art 10(2). This paragraph provides:  
  ‘The exercise of [the freedoms guaranteed by art 10(1)], since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
 It seems doubtful whether such restrictions on legal services advertising are ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ (emphasis added). These words set the bar high. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill wrote in Regina 
(Animal Defenders International v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 
1 AC 1312 at 1345 [26]:  
  ‘For a restriction to be necessary there must be a pressing social need for it, and it is for the member 
state which imposes the restriction to justify it. … [T]he importance of free expression is such that the 





(iii) Extension of the low-value road traffic claims procedure  
 
The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK)121 provide for a simplified claims procedure for low-
value road accident personal injury claims.122 This procedure applies where the value of the 
claim is between £1,000 and £10,000 and at least £1,000 is sought in respect of pain and 
suffering. The streamlined procedure aims to expedite the processing of claims to which it 
applies (it applies to approximately 75 per cent of road accident personal injury claims123). It 
also seeks, by way of a fixed costs regime, to keep costs in proportion to the value of the 
claim. Lord Young proposed increasing the upper limit of claims that are subject to this 
procedure to £25,000 and extending the procedure to medical negligence cases.124 This 
proposal might be sensible, although one wonders whether bringing some higher-value and 
therefore more complex claims within this streamlined system will result in injustice since 
higher-value claims tend call for more detailed investigations. This point aside, however, it is 
unclear whether this proposal will address the ‘compensation culture’. Indeed, if 
implemented, it may increase the number of claims brought, the opposite of what Lord Young 
hopes to achieve. This is because the faster claims are processed, the more attractive seeking 
legal redress will become. Some people who would have been discouraged from claiming by 
the time it would take for their claim to be processed will be more inclined to claim if they are 
confident of obtaining an award more quickly.  
                                                 
121  SI 1998/3132.  
122  See, especially, Pt 8 and PD 8B (Pre-action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic 
Accidents). See further Department for Constitutional Affairs, Case Track Limits and the Claims Process for 
Personal Injury Claims, Consultation Paper 8 (London: Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007); 
Ministry of Justice, Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (London: Ministry of 
Justice, 2009).  
123  Ministry of Justice, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More 
Proportionate System, Consultation Paper 6 (2011) at 25-26 [76]. 




(iv) Success fees and ATE premiums 
 
In December 2009, Sir Rupert Jackson, a Lord Justice of Appeal, published his review of 
costs in civil litigation.125 Among the central recommendations that he made in his 
voluminous report are that success fees (the fee to which a lawyer who acts on a conditional 
fee agreement is entitled if the case is successful) and after-the-event (‘ATE’) insurance 
premiums (ATE insurance is insurance secured by the claimant when a claim is brought 
against the risk of having to bear the defendant’s costs) should cease to be recoverable as 
costs. Sir Rupert’s hope is that, by giving claimants a stake in the costs, it is more likely that 
costs will be more controlled than they are at present. In his Report, Lord Young urged the 
government to act on these recommendations.126 Presumably, he thought that their 
implementation might diminish the ‘compensation culture’. However, it is unclear whether 
success fees and ATE insurance premiums are causally related to the ‘compensation culture’. 
Both the use of conditional fee agreements and the availability of ATE insurance became 
widespread in 2000.127 Yet the volume of claims remained essentially constant at this time.128 
Accordingly, it is uncertain whether barring the recoverability of success fees or 
ATE insurance premiums as costs will do anything to resolve the ‘compensation culture’, at 
                                                 
125  Sir Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2009) 
(‘Jackson Report’). It is available online: 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/jackson-final-report-140110.pdf>. The 
Jackson Report is trenchantly criticised by K Oliphant et al, Working Group on Civil Litigation Costs: On A 
Slippery Slope – A Response to the Jackson Report (2011). This reply to the Jackson Report is available 
online: <http://ectil.org/oliphant/slippery-slope/>. See also R Lewis, ‘Litigation Costs and Before-the-Event 
Insurance: The Key to Access to Justice?’ (2011) 74 MLR 272; A Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on 
Costs––Plastering the Cracks to Shore up a Dysfunctional System’ (2010) 29 CJQ 263. 
126  Young Report at 21-22.  
127  Conditional fee agreements first appeared following the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 (UK) 
(SI 1995/1674). They were used extensively as a result of the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 2000 
(UK) (SI 2000/692). ATE insurance premiums became recoverable as costs following the enactment of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1999 (UK), s 29. Since this time, claimants have routinely bought such 
insurance.  
128  Lewis, Morris and Oliphant, above n 94 at 171-172. 
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least in so far as the idea of a ‘compensation culture’ is taken to mean a society in which too 
many lawsuits are commenced.129  
 
(v) Referral fees 
 
Personal injury solicitors have many of their clients referred to them by CMCs and insurers. 
In return for referrals, solicitors pay a fee.130 The fee is roughly £800 per case referred.131 The 
Jackson Report recommends that the payment of referral fees be banned,132 primarily on the 
ground that cases are being referred to the solicitor who pays the highest fee rather than the 
solicitor who is able to provide the best service to the client. Lord Young supported this 
recommendation in his Report.133 He thought that implementing it would help to solve the 
‘compensation culture’. This is not the place to comprehensively consider the merits of 
permitting the payment of referral fees. There is insufficient space in which to do so. 
However, it is worth noting that that the issue of referral fees draws in many of the 
considerations that are in play in relation to advertising by lawyers. Indeed, referral fees are 
essentially a fee paid by lawyers to have others advertise on their behalf. One of the strongest 
arguments against prohibiting legal advertising is that banning it would reduce information 
available to consumers about legal services and the law.134 The same argument militates 
against prohibiting referral fees. Coherence may demand, therefore, that the position taken in 
relation to advertising may affect what should be done in connection with referral fees and 
                                                 
129  Various meanings attached to the phrase ‘compensation culture’ were discussed earlier: see above Part III(E). 
130  Solicitors have been permitted to pay referral fees since an amendment to the Solicitors Conduct Rules in 
2004. See D Greene, ‘The Referral Fee Conundrum’ (2010) 160 NLJ 419 
131  D Budworth, M Costello and F Gibb, ‘Victory for Drivers in Insurance Scandal’, 9 September 2011, The 
Times, 1. 
132  Jackson Report at ch 20. 
133  Young Report at 20-21. 
134  See above Part III(F)(ii). 
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vice versa. This does not seem to have been appreciated by the authors of either the 




In general, the recommendations made in the Young Report are all ill-considered. Some of 
them are based on a defective understanding about the current state of law, such as those 
concerning Good Samaritans. Others, like that regarding the extension of the simplified 
procedure for road traffic personal injury claims, might increase the volume of claims and 
therefore aggravate the ‘compensation culture’. Yet others are supported only by emotive 
slogans and clichés rather than reasoned analysis. The proposals regarding advertising, for 
instance, do not suggest that any thought has been given to the merits of permitting lawyers to 
advertise their services. They are essentially propped up only by sound bites. At the root of 
many of these shortcomings in the Young Report is the failure of its author to identify clearly 
what he means by ‘compensation culture’. 
 
(G)  Implementation of the Young Report135 
 
The stage is set for the implementation of the Young Report’s recommendations. 
Responsibility for putting them into effect has fallen to the Department for Work and 
Pensions136 and the Ministry of Justice.137 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
                                                 
135  A timetable to the implementation of the proposals in the Young Report is provided in Annex M.  
136  The Department of Work and Pensions published a report on the implementation of the Young Report’s 
recommendations in March 2011: Department of Work and Pensions, Common Sense, Common Safety – 
Progress Report (London: Department of Work and Pensions, 2011). The report is available on the 
Department’s website: <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/cscs-progress-may-11.pdf>. 
137  Proposals to implement certain of the Young Report’s recommendations are detailed in Ministry of Justice, 
above n 123. 
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Offenders Bill,138 which was introduced by the government on 21 June 2011, contains 
provisions that prohibit the recovery of success fees and ATE insurance premiums as costs in 
most situations.139 On 9 September 2011, the Justice Minister announced plans to prohibit 
referral fees.140  
In March 2011, the Ministry of Justice published a consultation paper in which it indicated 
the government’s support for Lord Young’s recommendation that the ceiling of the simplified 
procedure applicable to road accident personal injury claims be raised from £10,000 to 
£25,000 (this change would bring approximately 90 per cent of road accident claims within 
this streamlined procedure).141 It also expressed the government’s agreement with 
Lord Young’s proposal to extend the simplified procedure to medical negligence claims, 
beginning with claims against the National Health Service.142 Indeed, the Ministry revealed 
that the government is contemplating going further than Lord Young in this connection in two 
respects. First, it seems that the government is interested in bringing public liability and 
employer’s liability claims within the simplified procedure’s net too.143 Secondly, the 
government is contemplating a claims ceiling of £50,000 in all four contexts (in relation to 
road accident claims, the government estimated that such an increase would result in 
approximately 95 per cent of claims being processed pursuant to the streaming procedure.)144  
Happily, it seems unlikely that Lord Young’s confused proposal concerning Good 
Samaritans will not be put into effect. Shortly after the Young Report was published, the 
                                                 
138  HC Bill 205 (2011). 
139  See Pt 2 of the Bill. 
140  Ministry of Justice, ‘Curbing Compensation Culture: Government to Ban Referral Fees’, Media Statement, 
9 September 2011 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/newsrelease090911a.htm>. On 
13 September 2011 Jack Straw introduced a private members bill, the Motor Insurance Regulation Bill (HC 
Bill 229), cl 1 of which prohibits referral fees.  
141  Ministry of Justice, above n 123, 23 [66]-[69]. 
142  Ibid, 25 [74]-[76]. 
143  Ibid, 25-26 [77]-[82]. 
144  Ibid, 23-26 [66]-[82]. 
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Department of Transport published a ‘Snow Code’145 advising occupiers that they were very 
unlikely to incur liability to pedestrians who slip and fall if they clear snow in front of their 
house. It seems that the government regards this as sufficient to address the public’s 
misconceptions regarding the responsibility in tort law of Good Samaritans.146  
It remains to be seen whether Lord Young’s proposal concerning advertising by lawyers 
will be implemented. The government seems to be less than enthusiastic about this 
recommendation. Of course, even if the government regards the volume and type of 
advertising as objectionable, it may feel that it is unnecessary to restrict or outlaw legal 
services advertising on account of the ‘compensation culture’ if referral fees are banned. This 
is because prohibiting referral fees would result in the disappearance of the CMC industry and 
the extensive advertising in which that industry engages.  
 
IV THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH REFORM EXPERIENCES COMPARED 
 
It is useful to reflect on some similarities and differences in the tort reform process in 
Australia and Britain. There are several parallels between the processes that are worth noting. 
First, in both jurisdictions, the reform process has been largely driven by stakeholders. 
Governments, for the most part, merely reacted to lobbying. They did not act on their own 
initiative. The major stakeholders are insurers and organisations representing claimant 
lawyers. The positions taken by these stakeholders have been firmly entrenched. Neither has 
been willing to give ground to the other. Secondly, governments in both Australia and Britain 
have focused on economics and efficiency rather than on broader considerations of justice. 
The politicians’ concentration on economics meant that their main concern has been with 
cutting the cost of the tort system to society. The interest in achieving inter-personal justice 
                                                 
145  The code is available on the Department’s website: 
<http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Nl1/Newsroom/DG_191868>. 
146  Department of Work and Pensions, above n 136, at 11.  
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between tortfeasors and victims has occupied little, if any, space in the minds of politicians. 
Thirdly, in both Australia and Britain, the media played an influential role in the reform 
process. It thrust the tort system into the public’s eye. By and large, it has been highly critical 
of lawyers, the judiciary, and claimants. Reports of the tort system have generally been 
grossly distorted. The manner in which it has been portrayed generally bears little 
resemblance to reality. One of the most regrettable features of the reporting is that the 
difference between a claim being brought and a claim succeeding has often been suppressed. 
Accordingly, the impression has been created that claims that had little chance of succeeding 
led to an award of damages.  
 Although the tort reform processes in Australian and Britain have much in common, there 
are some significant differences between the Australian and British experiences in this regard. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference concerns the location where insurers and lawyers 
have clashed. In Australia, the war between these stakeholders took place in the law 
governing liability and the assessment of damages. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this is where the 
governments of Australia focused their attention. As described earlier,147 the reforms enacted 
in the wake of the Ipp Report made establishing liability significantly harder in many cases 
and severely restricted the damages to which successful claimants are entitled. Little thought 
was given to the procedure by which tort law was administered. For example, barely an 
eyebrow was raised about the fact that claimant personal injury lawyers in Australia, like their 
counterparts in Britain, invariably work pursuant to conditional fee agreements. The 
experience in Britain could hardly have been more different. The battle between insurers and 
lawyers in Britain has been waged not over the law of liability or that concerning the 
assessment of damages. Rather, the major campaigns have been fought in the realm of 
                                                 
147  See above Part II(E). 
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procedure. In particular, brutal battles have taken place in relation to costs.148 Because 
attention in Britain has been focused nearly exclusively on the procedural system, the 
substantive law of torts, including the law governing the assessment of damages, has largely 
escaped legislative alteration (for the moment).  
 It is not easy to explain this profound difference in the tort reform process in Australian 
and Britain (which so far seems to have gone unnoticed). Why have things unfolded so 
differently in two countries the legal systems of which have so much in common? It is 
conceivable that it is merely a historical accident.149 However, a more plausible explanation 
has to do with differences in political ideology. Arguably, the idea of the Welfare State has 
more attraction in Britain than in Australia. Consider, for example, the fact that the National 
Health Service, the jewel in the crown of the British Welfare State, is regarded as sacrosanct 
in England. In Australia, no such reverence is given to state-funded medical arrangements. 
Indeed, in Australia, significant efforts have been made, primarily through a generous 
premium rebate scheme,150 to encourage citizens to purchase private health insurance. The 
latest statistics reveal that approximately 45 per cent of Australians have such insurance.151 
Conversely, only around 6 per cent of adults Britain and Scotland have private health 
insurance.152 This example gives some insight in the wildly different attitudes held in 
Australia and Britain regarding state-run welfare arrangements, of which tort law is an 
                                                 
148  Brooke LJ in Hollins v Russell [2003] EWCA Civ 718 [2003] 1 WLR 2487 at 2506 [42]; [2003] 4 All ER 
590 at 605 likened the conflict between insurers and claimant lawyers to ‘trench warfare’. 
149  It is true that there is a long history of legislative intervention in Australia (especially in New South Wales) in 
the law on liability and remedies in the tort context (see, for instance, the radical changes made to motor 
vehicle accident compensation in New South Wales by the Transport Accidents Compensation Act 1987 
(NSW) (since repealed). It may have been natural, therefore, for Australian legislatures to continue to 
concentrate their attention on these areas than on issues in procedure. However, this does not explain why the 
Australian legislatures focussed their attention in this way to begin with. 
150 Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1998 (Cth). This Act was repealed by the Private Health Insurance 
(Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2007 (Cth). The rebate scheme is now 
provided for by the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (Cth).  
151 The private health insurance industry in Australia is regulated by the Private Health Insurance Administration 
Council. Extensive statistical information is provided on its website: <http://www.phiac.gov.au/>. 
152  Department of Health, ONS General Household Survey - Private Medical Insurance (London: Department of 





example. This difference in views may go some way towards explaining why profound 
reductions in the availability of tort compensation have been politically palatable in Australia 
but have not even been seriously considered in Britain. British insurers are well aware that 
there is less political resistance to modifying the procedure by which tort law is administered 




Tort reform swept across Australia following the 2001-2002 insurance crisis that occurred in 
that country. These reforms severely curtailed the circumstances in which liability in tort 
arises and the quantum of damages recoverable. In Britain, less extensive but nevertheless 
important reforms are in the works. Change, it seems, is coming to Britain too. This article 
has described the Australian reforms and those contemplated in Britain. The reform process in 
both countries has been quite similar in certain respects. However, a major difference between 
them is that the Australian reforms primarily concerned the law on liability and damages 
whereas the changes presently being mooted in Britain are directed mainly at the procedural 
regime by which tort law is administered. This difference may be attributable to Welfare State 
ideology enjoying greater vitality in Britain than in Australia.  
 
